Increased flooding is expected to be one of the greatest threats caused by climate change. Flood insurance helps to cope with the risk of flooding, but take-up rates are relatively low in many places. Mainly in developing countries, index-based flood insurancewhere the insurer's payout is based on pre-agreed weather indices instead of actual losshas been marketed recently. In this paper, we investigate whether the introduction of index-based flood insurance with relatively low premiums is likely to attract new customers in a high-income country, namely Germany. We use data from a discrete choice experiment combined with damage data for a major flood in 2013. We find index-based flood insurance to attract similar customers as traditional damage-based, while the latter is preferred on average. Our results suggest that not many new customers would enter the market, once index-based flood insurance were available.
INTRODUCTION
Floods pose a major natural hazard to economic development and human wellbeing, in developing as well as high-income countries (Ciscar et al., 2011) . Moreover, climate change is expected to induce an increase in severity and frequency of flood events (Hirabayashi et al., 2013; IPCC, 2012) . Against this background, flood insurance plays an important role in coping with floods, mitigation of damage and pricing of risks. Climate change will only increase the relevance of viable insurance markets (Collier et al., 2009 ). However, take-up rates for private flood insurance are remarkably low (Kunreuther, 1984; Schwarze et al., 2011) . The European Commission (2013) recognizes that market penetration rates are 'only high in cases where those risks are bundled with other risks ' (European Commission, 2013, p. 7) . This leaves countries like Austria, Germany, Italy, Poland and others with insurance densities of less than 50% (Lamond and Penning-Rowsell, 2014) . In Germany, market penetration of flood insurance is as low as 37%, albeit increasing in the last years (GDV, 2016a) . If insurance densities are low, risk-pooling and sharing will be impeded, and flood insurance will become less profitable to the companies. Consequently, premiums tend to increase and even less households will purchase coverage (the so-called 'disaster syndrome', studied by Kunreuther, 1996 and Raschky et al., 2013) . In order to escape this vicious circle, governments try to foster private demand by various instruments, such as public insurance programs (e.g., in the US), publicly financed re-insurance (e.g., in France), or risk awareness campaigns (e.g., in Germany 1 ). Despite these efforts, in insurance markets without an obligation to insure flood risks, the take-up rates remain relatively low. In this paper, we analyze the potential of increasing voluntary insurance demand by introducing index-based insurance (IBI)an insurance type with comparably low transaction costs and hence possibly lower premiums. According to consumer demand theory, and as has been shown in several empirical studies (presented in the literature section), a decrease in premiums would persuade more households to contract and the market penetration would increase.
In the case of IBI, payments of the insurer are bound to one or several previously determined weather indices which correlate with damage; for example, the amount of precipitation at a specific location. Major advantages relative to damage-based insurance (DBI) are lower administrative costs (typically individual damage assessments are not needed) and the absence of moral hazard (Barnett et al., 2008; Cole et al., 2012) . However, IBI bears the risk that the actual damage of an insured is not fully covered ('basis risk'). Hence, the final wealth of the insured may vary, and the variance depends upon the strength of the correlation between the index which triggers insurance payments and the actual damage.
Despite growing experience and research with IBI in developing countries (e.g., Barnett et al., 2008; Skees, 2008) , it is not clear yet whether such insurance could enhance insurance demand in a high-income country context. This is exactly the topic of this paper. We analyze the demand for conventional (damage-based) and index-based flood insurance in the case of Germany using data from a discrete choice experiment (DCE) . We identify factors that influence the choice between damage-based, index-based and no flood insurance. In particular, by exploring the take-up potential of index-based flood insurance, we provide the first empirical results on its attractiveness in a high-income country.
Hence, we raise IBI in the context of mitigating a demand side problem, although it has primarily been developed as a means to overcome supply side problems, especially in low-income countries. 2 However, there is the possibility that private demand as well is positively affected by the introduction of IBI. To illustrate this point, assume a flood insurance market where only DBI is available and take-up-rates are relatively low. Compared to DBI, as noted above, IBI bears advantages in terms of less information asymmetries and lower transaction costs. Once IBI is introduced, and if its advantages were translated into lower 1. In its coalition agreement, the federal government of Germany states that the introduction of a compulsory flood insurance scheme should be considered in order to increase the insurance density (CDU et al., 2013) . Furthermore, it regards the increase in the insurance density as an important aspect of climate change adaptation (Bundesregierung, 2015) . 2. On-site damage assessments are often complex and costly in remote, rural areas. With IBI, individual damage assessments become obsolete and administrative costs of the insurance may fall substantially. In some cases, IBI may permit retailing insurance policies where it was not possible with conventional, damages-based policies.
premiums, aggregate demand for insurance could therefore rise relative to the previous state where only DBI was available. 3 Notwithstanding that IBI has primarily been analyzed in a developing context so far, there is a number of arguments why IBI, especially index-based flood insurance, may become more important even in richer countries. First, given low flood insurance penetration, insurance companies may see the opportunity to gain new clients by offering a new, cheaper product type based on weather indices. Especially in a highly competitive insurance market like Germany, the potential of reaching new clients may trigger the interest and efforts of insurance companies in developing an IBI. Transaction costs in the German home insurance market are indeed non-negligible, as aggregated data suggest: In 2010-2015, 24-28% of the collected premiums were used for costs not associated with damage compensation (GDV, 2016b) . Furthermore, moral hazard is often seen as a problem for flood insurance as policy holders have some possibilities to influence their own risk ex ante (GDV, 2013 (GDV, , 2014 Skees and Barnett, 1999) . With IBI, insurance coverage does not reduce the incentives to mitigate flood riskhence, there is no risk of moral hazard (Barnett et al., 2008; Cole et al., 2012) . Also, policy-makers have an interest that more households insure themselves and may see IBI as an additional instrument to reach higher take-up rates. This finds expression in the EU's green paper on insurance (European Commission, 2013, p.10), which says that: 'It [IBI] can improve affordability of insurance by reducing administrative costs, because it does not include a claims adjustment process. It also speeds up payouts, and can be associated with simpler insurance contracts'.
Second, there is already a small, but increasing market of various IBI for consumers also in high-income countries. In Germany, clients can insure against rainy weather during their summer holiday or when visiting outdoor fun parks. Businesses, for example, outdoor caterer or event manager, can insure against income losses due to bad weather. These policies are partly seen as oddities so far, but may get more relevant in future.
Finally, in high-income countries, accurate and reliable weather observations are typically well availablethis is a precondition for the functioning of IBI schemes. Regarding flood insurance, possible indices may include precipitation which is observed via radar systems and weather stations. The extent of river flooding can be assessed by automatic gauges and satellites. In Germany, which we take as a case study, all these weather observation systems are well available and provide a spatially and temporally detailed and accurate picture of hydrological events such as floods. Moreover, high-income countries are typically in the position to provide long-term and reliable weather data, which would be needed for setting the parameters of an IBI scheme. In this context, the German Insurance Association (GDV) recently started a research project on the correlation of heavy rain and insured damage in the 2000s (GDV, 2015) . Potentially, the results may be used for parametrizing an index-based flood insurance and assessing the basis risk which stays with the insured household.
3. A similar reasoning is given by Kousky and Shabman (2015) in their proposal of a community flood insurance scheme in the US.
Demand for Index-Based Flood Insurance
Given these preconditions, one may ask why IBI has not yet been introduced in high-income countries. In response to the EU's proposal to use IBI to increase demand (EC, 2013) , the German insurance industry has emphasized the existence of basis risk in these products and expected that German customers will ultimately not accept them (GDV, 2013) . 4 However, there is a lack of empirical basis to draw reliable conclusions about the likely demand response. Our research enables first such insights into the extent and determinants of demand for index-based flood insurance.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In lack of existing literature on the demand for index-based flood insurance in high-income countries, we review two related literature strands in Section 2: empirical studies focusing on demand for IBI in developing countries, and those analyzing conventional flood insurance markets in high-income countries. In Section 3, we describe the data, the experimental design, and the econometric approach used in our analysis. The empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 4. The final section summarizes and concludes.
LITERATURE REVIEW
In this section, we first review the empirical literature on IBI demand in developing countries. For high-income countries, there is almost no empirical evidence. However, in order to relate our results to the existing literature, we will summarize the main determinants of conventional flood insurance demand in Germany and other high-income countries in the second part of this section.
There is a growing literature body on the determinants of IBI in developing countries (see Miranda and Farrin (2012) for a literature review on case studies throughout the world). So far, all implemented or hypothetical insurance schemes which were analyzed empirically provide coverage of agricultural or pastoral production. Hill et al. (2013) use Ethiopian rural household survey data and show that educated, wealthy and risk-seeking households are more likely to purchase IBI. These results are broadly confirmed by Bogale (2015) who finds additional negative effects of the availability of non-farm income and remittances. Gin e et al. (2008) report similar results for smallholder farmers in rural India. Alongside household and farm characteristics, results of Cole et al. (2014) suggest that experience in the village may play a major role. Using panel data of 7 years in an Indian context, they find that the probability to purchase indexbased crop insurance increases with previous payouts within the same village. The authors conclude that information about insurance payouts have villagewide demand effects. Regarding the role of product comprehension, Takahashi et al. (2016) come to the conclusion that improved knowledge about IBI per se 4. Kousky and Shabman (2015) recognize the relevance of the basis risk for homeowners in a developed country setting and propose a layered approach of index-based and damage-based flood insurance contracts, where the DBI eliminates the basis risk of the IBI for a relatively low cost.
Another reason for the nonexistence of IBI may be that some of the technical and scientific preconditions such as precise remote-sense weather observation and models linking flood damage and weather parameters were developed just recently or are currently in the process of development.
does not necessarily increase demand. However, they find strong evidence for price effects in their data from Ethiopia. The relevance of the basis risk for the demand for IBI is highlighted both in theoretical and empirical works by Clarke (2016) and Jensen et al. (2016) . Remarkably, although basis risk is generally seen as the main drawback of IBI, its magnitude and its demand effects are seldom analyzed in quantitative terms (Carter et al., 2014) . Finally, gender differences in the demand for IBI are analyzed by Akter et al. (2016) . The results from a DCE in coastal Bangladesh suggest that women are less willing to use insurance services, which cannot be fully explained by differences in risk and time preferences. Instead, farmers' level of trust in the insurance industry and financial literacy are suggested as the main determinants of gender differences in the preferences for IBI. For index-based agricultural insurance demand in high-income countries, there is very limited evidence. In a DCE on government intervention in agricultural insurance markets in Finland, Liesivaara and Myyr€ a (2014) postulate a higher willingness-to-pay for index-based contracts than for comparable conventional insurance policies. Being a by-product in their paper, the authors do not further discuss this result. To the best of our knowledge, there is no single study on the demand for IBI covering private homes or contents. However, we can draw on a large and growing number of empirical studies on demand for conventional (damage-based) flood insurance in high-income countries. Browne et al. (2015) exploit customer data of a large insurance company in Germany. Atreya et al. (2015) , Browne and Hoyt (2000) , Michel-Kerjan and Kousky (2010) and Kriesel and Landry (2004) analyze the extent of flood insurance demand on a larger regional level (states or communities). The remaining studies use household survey data to assess the demand for insurance coverage. In terms of methodology, Botzen and van den Bergh (2012) and Brouwer and Schaafsma (2013) are very close to our approach. Both studies employ DCEs in order to assess the demand for an insurance product which is not available in the market. Both focus on insurance demand in the Netherlands. For Germany, flood insurance demand has been analyzed in a small number of studies (Browne et al., 2015; Bubeck et al., 2013; Raschky et al., 2013) . The remaining literature on flood insurance demand covers countries like the USA (Atreya et al., 2015; Kousky, 2011; Landry and Jahan-Parvar, 2011; Lindell and Hwang, 2008; Michel-Kerjan and Kousky, 2010; Petrolia et al., 2013) , the Netherlands (Terpstra and Lindell, 2012) and the UK (Bichard and Kazmierczak, 2012) . Most of these studies show that the attractiveness of flood insurance correlates positively with income, the value of the home, household size, perceived flood risk and prior damage experience. Throughout all studies, demand correlates negatively with insurance premiums, often with a lower sensitivity for higher income households. Further control variables (e.g., gender, age, level of education) show mixed or non-significant correlations with insurance demand.
Our contribution to the existing literature is the following: We provide novel empirical evidence on the demand for index-based insurance outside the agriculture and livestock sector and in a high-income country context. Furthermore, we compare preferences for conventional and index-based flood insurance, and quantify the differences in utility between the two in monetary terms.
DATA AND METHODS

Data and experimental design
We use data from a DCE in which respondents could choose between damagebased and index-based flood insurance. The DCE was part of a larger survey of German homeowners conducted in June and July 2014 by forsa, a professional market research company. 5 Some 4,000 homeowners were sampled from forsa's master household sample, which is nationally representative of household size and regional distribution. The questionnaire was accessible online and via the TV screen at home. Respondents were queried about their beliefs, experiences, perceptions and attitudes on various issues related to extreme weather events and climate change adaptation. During the survey period, no natural disaster occurred in Germany or was prevalent in the media. The most recent major flood in Germany occurred in June 2013, 1 year before the survey, which may have had an effect on flood risk perception, especially in the affected regions (e.g., Atreya et al., 2013; Kousky, 2010) . In order to be able to control for the effects of the 2013 flood on insurance demand, we merge the survey data with data on flood insurance claims provided by the GDV.
From the sampled homeowners, 3,465 live in a detached house or use ground floors or basements and are thus potentially interested in insuring their property against floods. Since respondents were expected to be unfamiliar with indexbased insurance, they were informed about its characteristics prior to the DCE. A concise paragraph explained that the insurer's payment is then based on a predetermined weather index, such as rainfall or water level, and independent from the actual damage, emphasizing that in some cases the payment may be higher than the damage, while in others lower. This paragraph was followed by the question whether the respondent would generally consider such an index-based flood insurance, if available. Only those who did not categorically rule out IBI at this stage (35%), i.e., only potential customers, were presented with the DCE. This was done because of our concern that people who are unresponsive to index-based insurance might perceive the DCE as completely inconsequential to them and might not seriously participate in it, leading to biased coefficient estimates. 6 Therefore, the remaining sample for the DCE of this study consists of 1,161 homeowners. 7 5. For more information on the survey, including the questionnaire (in German language), see Osberghaus (2015) . 6. Carson and Groves (2007) argue that only consequential survey questions can be expected to produce useful information about a respondent's preferences. Necessary conditions for survey questions to be consequential are that the respondent must care about the provision of the private or public good at hand and that he or she must view the survey outcome as potentially influencing the good's provision. If one of these conditions is violated, answering the survey question does not affect the respondent's expected utility, and responses may not be interpreted using economic theory (ibid.). In our case, survey results may indirectly encourage or discourage the introduction of IBI. Those homeowners who categorically rule out IBI are very unlikely to care about it. 7. Differences between the original and final sample are presented in Section 4 and the Appendix.
Note that 46 respondents who did not rule out IBI abandoned the survey before answering the DCE.
We kept the experimental design very simple. The DCE involved two labeled insurance alternatives, one damage-based and one index-based, both described by only one attribute, the insurance premium. Because in Germany, unlike many countries, typical flood insurance policies include almost full coverage for flood damage, there was no need for including coverage as attribute to further specify the damage-based alternative. Respondents were instructed to consider the alternatives to be identical in all other respects (e.g., insurance company, sales channel) and asked to select the most preferred one. Thus, in the DCE, potential customers are required to tradeoff between insurance type and price. In order to enhance the realism of the choice setting (Carson et al., 1994) , respondents also had the option to opt out by choosing no flood insurance at zero costs. Table 1 shows an example of a choice set (translated from German).
For the insurance premium, we used three attribute levels when designing the choice sets: low, medium and high. When answering the choice sets, respondents saw premium levels in euro-per-year terms, which were customized based on the respondent's perceived flood risk at home. The perceived flood risk was queried earlier in the questionnaire using the four risk categories used by the GDV. Table 2 shows these risk categories, the share of respondents, and the related premium levels. The selected attribute levels reflect current prices for flood insurance and the fact that premiums increase with risk. They were drawn from Stiftung Warentest, the leading German consumer organization, and FinanceScout24, a price-comparison website for financial products. By customizing the insurance premium that way, we enhance the relevance of the attribute levels (Hensher et al., 2005) and make the choice sets more realistic. Demand for Index-Based Flood Insurance
Given two labeled alternatives and one three-level attribute, there are only nine (3 (2 9 1) ) possible choice sets. However, we further reduced this number to six by dropping those choice sets where the two insurance alternatives are equally priced, ensuring minimal overlap while keeping the design orthogonal and level balanced. 8 In the DCE, each respondent faced these same six choice sets, but in randomized order and, as mentioned above, with customized premium levels.
Before answering the series of choice tasks, respondents were provided with a set of instructions. First, they were asked to answer as if they have no flood insurance on their home yet. Therefore, whenever respondents opt out and choose no flood insurance, we do not have to worry about anyone interpreting this option as falling back to any own insurance cover, for which we lack credible information. Second, respondents were reminded of their self-reported perceived flood risk and asked to consider this risk level in their choice. Respondents who answered 'don't know' to the risk question were told to consider a flood risk of once every 50-200 years. Third, respondents were asked to assume that the thresholds of rainfall and water level used for the index-based alternative are chosen such that, on average, its insurance payments equal that of the damage-based alternative (though it can be lower or higher than the actual damage in a specific case). By avoiding specifying the variance of the index-triggered payments, we intentionally do not indicate a specific level of basis risk. 9 And finally, they were told to assume that rainfall and water level can be measured accurately and reliably for their property, for example, by satellite technology. Feedback from participants of the pretest and the main survey showed that choice tasks were perceived as clear and understandable.
Before we proceed, it is useful to reflect on whether there are any incentives to answer the choice questions strategically and to not reveal preferences truthfully. In general, a DCE with more than two alternatives and repeated choices is not incentive compatible if it involves the provision of a pure public good (Carson and Groves, 2007; Vossler et al., 2012) . In such a setting, optimal responses depend on the respondent's beliefs about other people's choices and how responses will be aggregated by the relevant agency. This is not necessarily the case if a DCE involves private goods, in particular if not only one of the multiple alternatives is likely to be provided (Carson and Groves, 2007) . In our setting, for example, it is unlikely that DBI would be crowded out from the insurance market if IBI was introduced. However, strategic answers still may be an issue with the introduction of a new private good like IBI. Respondents may have an incentive 8. Orthogonality, level balance and minimal overlap are desirable choice design properties (see, e.g., Hensher et al., 2005 and Huber and Zwerina, 1996 for detailed discussions of choice designs). To satisfy orthogonality, however, premium levels need to vary independently over alternatives and choice sets. This eliminates any correlation between insurance type and premium but may lead to some implausible attribute-level combinations, namely more expensive IBI alternatives. The realism of attribute-level combinations, however, is of less practical importance as sometimes feared (Moore and Holbrook, 1990 ). 9. We do this for three reasons: First, our main interest lies on the relative demand for an IBI product per se, independent of a specific basis risk level. Second, we lack information for a realistic basis risk level of an (yet to be developed) index-based flood insurance in Germany. Third, we designed a very simple DCE in order to keep the basic idea understandable to as many respondents as possible.
to overstate their true preferences for IBI if they anticipate that this will enlarge the range of flood insurance products they can choose from in the future, while there are no immediate financial consequences. We will come back to this issue when it helps to interpret our empirical findings.
Econometric modeling
We assume a random utility framework to analyze the choice data, as is typically done in DCE studies. In this framework, the utility U njt provided by alternative j to person n in choice situation t is assumed to be
is a deterministic (observed) utility component, depending on attributes of the alternative and characteristics of the person x njt , and ɛ njt is a (unobserved) stochastic component. According to the economic theory of utilitymaximizing behavior, person n chooses that alternative from the alternative set 1; . . .; Jg f which provides him with the greatest utility. Since utility is modeled as a random variable, however, only choice probabilities can be estimated. Depending on the assumptions made about the distribution of the random variables ɛ njt n ¼ 1; . . .; N; j ¼ 1; . . .; J; t ¼ 1; . . .; T ð Þ , different classes of discrete choice models can be defined.
In this paper, we use both standard multinomial logit (MNL) and mixed logit (MXL) models for the analysis. In MNL models, the ɛ njt are independent and identically distributed (iid) with type 1 extreme value distribution. As we further assume V to be linear in unknown parameters b, the probability that person n chooses alternative i in choice situation t takes the following closed form (e.g., Train, 2009) :
expðb 0 x njt Þ In our case, there are three alternatives per choice set (J = 3): a damage-based flood insurance (j = 1), an index-based flood insurance (j = 2) and no flood insurance (j = 3). The no-insurance alternative is used as the base alternative, its deterministic utility V n3t is therefore normalized to zero. The MNL models are fitted by maximum likelihood estimation using Stata's clogit command.
In the MXL specification, we include an additional error component g n d njt , where g n is a normally distributed random term with zero mean, and d njt a dummy variable that identifies the two flood insurance alternatives (i.e., d njt = 1 if j < 3; 0 otherwise). Thereby, we allow the two insurance types to be correlated in unobserved factors. This relaxes the well-known IIA assumption of standard logit, and thus might represent a more realistic substitution pattern, in particular, in the presence of the no-insurance alternative (e.g., Hess and Rose, 2009; Scarpa et al., 2005) . In addition, we specify the insurance premium coefficient(s) a to be lognormally distributed. This allows for unobserved heterogeneity in price sensitivity while ensuring the behaviorally plausible coefficient sign and finite moments for willingness-to-pay estimates (e.g., Daly et al., 2012; Meijer and Rouwendal, 2006) . To account for repeated choices by the same person, we Demand for Index-Based Flood Insurance hold these random terms constant over choice situations. The probability for a sequence of choices i ¼ i 1 ; . . .; i T ð Þcan then be written as the double integral of a product of standard logit probabilities over all values of a and g, weighted by the (normal) density f of ln(a) and the (normal) density g of g (e.g., Train, 2009 ), i.e.,
where b, l a , r a and r g are the parameters to be estimated. As this double integral cannot be solved analytically, it has to be approximated through simulation during the estimation process. We use Halton draws with 2,500 replications for the maximum simulated likelihood estimation using Stata's mixlogit command (Hole, 2007) . Table 3 describes the variables used in the econometric analysis. We regress the choice outcome on insurance premium, type of insurance as well as individual and property characteristics. We include information on the respondent's gender, age, education, risk attitude and perceived flood risk as well as the household's income. In addition, we control for the house value, implemented flood protection measures and damage caused by the 2013 flood in the respective county. Because the non-experimental variables do not vary over alternatives, they enter the choice models interacted with alternative-specific dummy variables for damage-based and index-based flood insurance. In this way, we can identify who is more likely to choose a particular insurance type.
The insurance premium enables us to measure differences in utility between the insurance alternatives in monetary terms. The extra premium that keeps utility constant when switching from alternative j to alternative i is given by the following ratio:
Since a is lognormally distributed and the numerator is constant, p extra also follows a lognormal distribution. If p extra is positive, it can be interpreted as the willingness to pay (WTP) for switching from j to i, otherwise, as the compensation that leaves the insured not worse off.
RESULTS
There is widespread skepticism in our sample about the benefits of IBI. 10 Almost two-thirds of homeowners stated that they would certainly not consider IBI to insure their property against flood damage, even if it were cheaper than a conventional DBI. The remaining would possibly consider it (22%) or were undecided (13%). Recall that only the latter two groups of respondents, those who did not categorically rule out the IBI option, were presented with the DCE. Contingency table and simple logit regression analysis reveals that those perceiving higher flood risks and having implemented flood protection measures are 10. In the remainder of the paper, the abbreviations IBI and DBI refer specifically to index-based flood insurance and damage-based flood insurance, respectively. Notes: a Those respondents who answered 'don't know' to the flood risk question were told to consider a flood risk of once every 50-200 years when answering the DCE.
Demand for Index-Based Flood Insurance more likely to judge IBI favorably. We find that women tend to be more undecided. But there are no significant differences in terms of age, education, income, risk attitudes or actual insurance coverage between the IBI refusers and the rest. More details on the screening question and the filtered subsamples are provided in the Appendix. In the DCE, with varying insurance premiums, the IBI alternative was chosen in 22% of the cases, DBI in 42% and no flood insurance in 36%. It is noteworthy that 23% of the chosen IBI alternatives (representing 5% of all cases) were more expensive than their DBI counterparts. This may be an indication that some respondents answered strategically to encourage the introduction of IBI, as discussed in Section 3. We are interested in identifying the factors that influence homeowners to choose one flood insurance over another. Therefore, as mentioned above, we regress the choice outcome on insurance premium, type of insurance and individual-specific factors, using MNL and MXL model specifications. The next section presents and discusses the parameter estimates. Table 4 shows the results of our multivariate regression analysis of the choice data. The first two columns give the estimates of the MNL-1 model that provides a useful starting point for our empirical analysis. Let us look at the two main findings that emerge from MNL-1, and which are fairly consistent across the other models.
Parameter estimates
First, we find the insurance premium and the self-perceived flood risk to be the two most important factors in choosing a flood insurance. Higher premiums make flood insurance less attractive, higher flood risks make them more attractive, as expected. This is consistent with results from previous studies (e.g., Botzen and van den Bergh, 2012; Brouwer and Schaafsma, 2013; Browne and Hoyt, 2000; Kunreuther, 1996) . For each flood risk category (see Table 2 ), a single dummy variable is included in the model, with the lowest riska recurrence interval of at least 200 yearsserving as the omitted category. All these risk dummies enter positively and significantly; the point estimates of their coefficients even increase monotonically with perceived flood risk (which is not quite the case in models MNL-2 and MXL). With a further dummy, we separately identify respondents who answered 'don't know' to the flood risk question. Those were asked to consider a flood risk of once every 50-200 years when answering the DCE. The estimated coefficients for the 'don't know' variables are positive and significant, too, but lower than the other ones, suggesting that perceived risks influence choices stronger than assumed risks.
Second, we find the alternative-specific coefficient estimates to be equal in sign and very similar in magnitude for DBI and IBI. We include a number of covariates that are invariant across alternatives, such as age, income, or house value, to control for observed heterogeneity of preferences. Some of them appear to influence choices, some do not, as we will discuss later. However, the impact of most of these variables does not significantly differ between the two types of insurance policies. So these variables affect, if at all, the choice of any flood insurance over the non-option, but not so much the choice Notes: Column 5 gives the estimated means (l) and standard deviations (r) of the log of the risk-specific insurance premium coefficients (where the flood risk dummies are interacted with the negative of insurance premium); the median, mean and standard deviation of the coefficients themselves can be computed by exp(l), exp(l + r 2 /2) and expðl þ r 2 =2Þ Â ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi ffi exp r 2 ð ÞÀ1 p , respectively (Hole, 2007) . Triple, double and single asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
between DBI and IBI. Statistically significant differences between DBI and IBI can be observed only in terms of experiences with Germany's 2013 flood, the highest flood risk level (i.e., recurrence interval of 10 years or less), and to a lesser extent education. 11 Homeowners living in 2013 flood-hit counties or who perceive an extremely high level of flood risk tend to prefer IBI over DBI (Wald tests: p = 0.027 and p = 0.028, respectively). This suggests that once people see themselves confronted with the threat of flooding, be it implied or expressed, the simpler and less bureaucratic IBI becomes more attractive. Perhaps some of these homeowners or their neighbors experienced flood damage in the past and were dissatisfied with the performance of their insurer, and therefore prefer IBI. However, strategic responses may also contribute to this finding. Because flood-threatened people typically face higher premiums, or in extreme cases, even insurance companies that are reluctant to insure them, they may have the strongest incentives to overrate their preferences for a new insurance product like IBI in the hope that this enlarges their future realworld choice set. Lastly, individuals with a university degree seem to be more reluctant to take up damage-based flood insurance, but not so much indexbased ones (Wald test: p = 0.082).
In the MNL-2 model, we interact the premium variable with the different flood risk dummies to examine whether price sensitivity varies with perceived flood risk. As can be seen in columns 3 and 4, the estimates provide strong evidence for heterogeneous price effects. The premium coefficients are significant and negative for each risk category, but much lower (in absolute value) for the high-risk categories. The premium coefficient related to the highest flood risk (at least once every 10 years) is about 16 times smaller, and the one related to the second highest flood risk (once every 10-50 years) about 2.5 times, than that related to the lowest flood risk (less than once every 200 years). We observe no significant differences in price sensitivity across the two low-risk categories. This clearly suggests that homeowners are less price sensitive regarding flood insurance products the higher the perceived risk. This makes sense given that the expected utility of such an insurance increases with flood risk.
We now turn to the estimated MXL model shown in the last two columns of Table 4 . In MXL, we keep the risk-specific premium variables as in MNL-2, but this time with random coefficients. The MXL model outperforms the MNL-2 model. Allowing for random price sensitivity as well as correlation in unobserved factors and over time improves the model fit considerably (likelihood ratio test: p = 0.000).
Note that Column 5 of Table 4 gives the estimated means (l) and standard deviations (r) of the log of the risk-specific insurance premium coefficients, where the flood risk dummies are interacted with the negative of insurance premium. Because the natural logarithm is defined only for positive numbers, and insurance premium is expected to have a negative coefficient, we follow the 11. There is also a statistically significant difference for respondents who did not know how to rate their property's flood risk, preferring DBI over IBI. Possibly, those who are too 'lazy' to think about probabilities of flood events also tend to be unwilling to consider and become familiar with the unfamiliar insurance alternative, but this is only speculation. standard procedure and let negative premiums enter the MXL model (e.g., Hensher and Greene, 2003; Hole, 2007; Train, 2009 ). Therefore, the positive sign of the mean estimates of the log of the premium coefficients does not mean that homeowners prefer higher premiums, the opposite is true. The median of the coefficients themselves, which is often the most appropriate characteristic to look at in the lognormal case (Meijer and Rouwendal, 2006) , can be calculated by À1 9 exp(l), where multiplication by À1 undoes the sign change (Hole, 2007) . Accordingly, we have the following median estimates of the risk-specific premium coefficients, all of which are statistically significant 12 : À1.35 (flood risk > 10 years), À8.21 (10-50 years), À16.74 (50-200 years), À14.99 (< 200 years) and À14.67 ('don't know'). The standard deviations of the log of the random insurance premium coefficients are highly significant. This reveals strong heterogeneity in price sensitivity also among homeowners within the same flood risk category, which was not accounted for in the MNL-2 model. The error component is highly significant, indicating correlation in the unobserved portion of utility between the two insurance alternatives. This leads to increased substitution between DBI and IBI. In other words, a cheaper IBI would attract disproportionately more homeowners who previously have selected the damage-based alternative than those who have opted for no flood insurance at all, and vice versa. This possibility was ruled out in the MNL specifications. We will come back to this point in Section 4.3, where we predict choice probabilities under different scenarios.
Otherwise, the MXL model basically confirms the results of the MNL models, although the magnitude of the estimated coefficients increases and the significance level of some of them changes. The former effect is simply due to the different scale of utility, as now some of the variance in the unobserved factors is captured by the additional random terms instead of the iid ɛ, whose normalization determines the scale (Brownstone and Train, 1999) .
In contrast to findings from the Netherlands (Botzen and van den Bergh, 2012), we find women to be more likely to select a flood insurance policy. The age coefficients for both flood insurance types are negative and significant. On average, older homeowners are wealthier, more likely to have paid off their mortgage, and less likely to experience a flood in their remaining lifetime. All of these factors might make them less concerned about possible flood damage and might explain our finding. The effect of income and house value on insurance demand is positive but not significant. Somewhat counterintuitively, the risk attitude variables have positive coefficients. Although the estimates lose their significance in the MXL model, the positive signs are robust to alternative specifications that we have tried. One explanation could be that risk-taking people tend to buy homes at higher flood risk, and that the risk characteristics of the property site are not fully captured by the other covariates. On the other hand, it is possible that our relatively simple measure for risk attitude is too imprecise to reflect the different types of risk-taking behavior documented in the literature (Bruhin et al., 2010; Petrolia et al., 2013) . Homeowners who have 12. Note that the insignificant estimate l associated with the highest flood risk, telling us that the mean of the log of the coefficient is not significantly different than zero, does not imply that exp(l), the median of the coefficient itself, is not significantly greater than zero.
implemented measures to protect their property from flooding and to limit the damage are more likely to select a flood insurance. Flood protection measures we observed include backflow traps, water-repellent rendering, water-resistant floors such as stone and tiles, and also non-technical measures such as moving valuable furnishings to the upper floors. Thus, we find no evidence for adverse selection in the sense that, conditional on having the same level of flood risk, the more vulnerable and unprepared have a higher demand for flood insurance. Rather, it seems that (arguably risk-averse) homeowners regard flood protection and insurance as complements. Our finding on private flood protection seems consistent with the empirical evidence on community-or state-level flood protection (Atreya et al., 2015; Botzen and van den Bergh, 2012; Kriesel and Landry, 2004) , although its effect on insurance demand varies across the types of measures (Landry and Jahan-Parvar, 2011) , across regions (Petrolia et al., 2013) , and is sometimes an artifact of country-specific market conditions (Bubeck et al., 2013) .
Remember that the effect of all these variables does not vary significantly between DBI and IBI. This shows that IBI attracts similar customers as DBI. Nevertheless, we find strong evidence that homeowners, on average, prefer DBI to IBI. This is indicated by the significant difference between the two alternativespecific constants (ASCs), which capture the average effects of omitted factors on utility (Wald test: p = 0.036). In the next section, we will quantify the difference in utility between DBI and IBI in monetary terms.
Willingness to pay
Based on the MXL model, we derive the WTP for having one's property flood insured with an IBI instead of a DBI. The WTP is the difference in premiums between IBI and DBI that keeps utility constant when changing the type of insurance. It is the discount in premium people would demand to take the basis risk inherent to IBI. As described in Section 3.2, the WTP follows a lognormal distribution. Lognormal distributions, however, can be highly skewed with a long right-hand tail, resulting in unreasonable mean estimates for WTP (Hensher and Greene, 2003) . We will therefore refer to the more robust median WTP in the following.
To take account of the heterogeneous price sensitivity among homeowners, we estimate the WTP under different flood risk scenarios. Within each flood risk category, we let the county's share of flood insurance claims for the flood of 2013 vary from 0 to 4%. The variables whose coefficients do not vary significantly between DBI and IBI are set to their means (continuous) or modes (dummy). Table 5 presents the median WTP estimates and their 95% confidence intervals, calculated using the delta method (see, e.g., Bliemer and Rose, 2013; Oehlert, 1992) . The first scenario, with the lowest flood risk and no flood insurance claims, yields a point estimate of À€56.7 with a confidence interval of À€89.9 to À€23.5. In other words, under this scenario, the monthly premium of an IBI would need to undercut the DBI premium by some €5 to make the insurances equally attractive. This is a substantial amount given the DBI premiums that are currently paid by insured living in low-risk areas. As soon as we move to Demand for Index-Based Flood Insurance counties that were more affected by the 2013 flood, the negative WTP for IBI decreases considerably. So, IBI would be more competitive there. The same pattern holds for the other categories of flood risk perception, although at different price levels. Note that the less price sensitive people are, the more they need to be compensated for an inferior product (since price is less decisive in their choice).
However, counties with higher shares of insurance claims are the exception rather than the rule. According to the GDV data, the maximum share for the 2013 flood is 12.5%. But the mean share is smaller than 1%, and in some 95% of the counties, 4% or less of the flood-insured filed claims. Moreover, only 1-2% of German homes are exposed to the highest level of flood risk. Therefore, our WTP estimates under the most conservative assumptions, that is, the lowest flood risk and share of insurance claims, are a useful benchmark for the relative superiority of DBI over IBI.
Choice probabilities
In this section, we illustrate how flood insurance demand would respond to the introduction of IBI plans that are equally priced or cheaper than available DBI plans by predicting average choice probabilities with the MXL model. In the simulations, we set the insurance premiums for DBI to the medium levels used in the DCE (i.e., €1,200 if flood risk > 10 years, €200 if 10-50 years, €70 if 50-200 years, €50 if < 200 years and €70 if 'don't know'; see Table 2 ), while the other independent variables take on their sample values. The probability of choosing each of the three alternatives under different IBI premiums is predicted for each individual and then averaged across the sample. Since our estimation sample is restricted to homeowners potentially interested in IBI, the predicted choice probabilities should not be interpreted as market shares. Table 6 presents the simulation results. Comparing the predictions of scenario 1, where only DBI is available, to the predictions of scenario 2, we can see that the net effect of introducing equally priced IBI plans on the overall demand for flood insurance is relatively small. The average probability of choosing no insurance decreases by less than 2 percentage points. In scenarios 3-5, the IBI premiums are 10%, 20% and 50% lower, respectively, than DBI premiums, and IBI demand increases accordingly. What is striking again is that homeowners are predicted to disproportionately substitute away from DBI to IBI. This reflects the similarity of the two insurance alternatives that the MXL model takes into account. Even in the rather unrealistic scenario 5, where IBI is offered at half the DBI price, we observe only a modest effect on the overall flood insurance demand. The last column of Table 6 reports the average change in the choice probability of IBI in response to a one euro decrease in the annual premiums for IBI under the given scenario. As expected (e.g., Train, 2009) , the marginal effect of an IBI premium reduction is greater when the probability of choosing IBI approaches 0.5, i.e., when uncertainty about the choice of IBI increases.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Flooding is a severe natural hazard, and its relevance will probably increase due to climate change in the future. In order to cushion financial losses of flood events and to generally enhance resilience against floods, policy-makers in many countries try to foster private flood insurance demand. Despite those efforts, Table 2 ), while the other independent variables take on their sample values. The reported marginal effects give the average change in the choice probability of index-based insurance (IBI) in response to a one euro decrease in the annual premiums for IBI under the given scenario.
voluntary insurance demand stays relatively weak. In this regard, IBI may help. In the case of IBI, the payments are bound to previously determined weather indices or parameters, for example, precipitation at the location of the insured. It is expected that IBI policies may be offered at lower premiums than comparable conventional insurance policies. In this case, IBI could be a new option for homeowners who are currently declining the more costly conventional insurance.
In this paper, we have analyzed the demand for IBI in Germany. Our results reveal a considerable skepticism about this alternative type of insurance. Almost two-thirds of the sampled homeowners have ruled out IBI as an option to insure their property against floods, regardless of its price and other terms and conditions. In a DCE, a sample of more than 1,000 homeowners who have not categorically ruled out IBI beforehand chose their preferred insurance policy. Besides a conventional (damage-based) policy and an index-based policy, participants could also opt for a no-insurance option. Controlling for many observable characteristics and allowing for correlation in unobserved factors, our econometric results confirm that, on average, German homeowners prefer DBI over IBI.
We have also examined potential differences in the determinants of demand for the two types of flood insurance. Significant differences would indicate that IBI has the potential to reach new customer segments. However, the determinants of insurance demand turn out to be very similar for DBI and IBI. We find only significant differences in terms of perceived flood risk and flood experience. Those who live in areas of the highest flood risk, both subjectively and objectively measured, seem to derive a greater utility from IBI than others. This finding should be interpreted with some caution, though, since it may be partly driven by strategic responses. But if high-risk households were indeed overrepresented in an IBI product, the risk-pooling possibilities would be limited. This problem, however, seems to be manageable given that also in an IBI context, premiums should roughly reflect risks, thereby limiting the risk of adverse selection.
Being the first empirical insight into the demand for IBI in a high-income country, these results suggest a sobering conclusion regarding the success probabilities of that novel instrument. At least in Germany, where our empirical study was carried out, private homeowners as potential clients were very reluctant to index-based insurance products. However, as flood insurance markets are characterized by strong national peculiarities (Schwarze et al., 2011) , further research may approach the question in other countries. In particular, the relevance of basis risk may differ between countries, but is also a topic which generally deserves more attention in future research. Similarly, it could be worthwhile to focus on specific customer segments, such as large enterprises or public actors who need to insure large infrastructure assets. Given the relatively higher attractiveness of IBI in flood-experienced and flood-prone areas, its role may also be strengthened if climate change induces a considerable upward trend of flood risks. But in general, the potential of index-based insurance solutions for increasing resilience against natural hazards in highincome countries as hoped for by some policy-makers still has to be proved. Table A1 . Information about index-based flood insurance presented to the survey respondents, and subsequent question You have the option to insure your home against flood damage. Imagine that a renowned insurance company offers the following new type of flood insurance to you:
APPENDIX
The insurance company pays if certain pre-agreed weather data (for example, rainfall or water levels) are observed in your place of residence. Also the amount of insurance payment is based on this weather data. The weather data is measured by an independent institution. Thus, the insurance company will pay regardless of the actual damage suffered. Even if you should have suffered no or only minor flood damage, you will receive a payout based on the weather data. Conversely, it may also happen that the insurance payment will be lower than your damage. Because the exact damage does not have to be determined, the premiums may be lower than in a 'standard' insurance contract.
Suppose you basically were interested in flood insurance, would you consider such a weather-based flood insurance when it is cheaper than a 'standard' Notes: The variable House value is not included in this logit regression, because only later participants of the DCE were asked the respective question. The number of observations is smaller than 3,465 mainly due to missings in the variable Income. Triple, double, and single asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
